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Cybersurveillance in a Free Society 
Russell L. Weaver* 
When Edward Snowden stole and released thousands of 
National Security Agency (NSA) documents,1 he exposed a massive 
secret governmental cybersurveillance operation.2 Although U.S. 
citizens might have anticipated that the U.S. government was 
collecting information about terrorists and criminals, few could 
have imagined the all-encompassing nature of the NSA 
surveillance program.3 With a budget of $10.8 billion per year4 and 
35,000 employees,5 the NSA was systematically collecting data 
about virtually everyone and everything, amassing millions of cell 
phone call records, e-mails, text messages, credit-card-purchase 
records, and information from social media networks.6 In addition, 
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 1. See Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A.: 
From Spying on Leader of U.N. to Tracking Drug Deals, an Ethos of ‘Why Not?’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2013, at A1, A10 (“Since Edward J. Snowden began releasing 
the agency’s documents in June, the unrelenting stream of disclosures has opened 
the most extended debate on the agency’s mission since its creation in 1952.”); 
Doug Stanglin, Snowden Says NSA Can Tap Email Chats, COURIER-J., Aug. 1, 
2013, at A3 (“Documents provided by National Security Agency leaker Edward 
Snowden detail a top-secret program that purportedly allows analysts to search 
without prior authorization, large databases of emails, online chats and people’s 
individual browsing histories, The Guardian reports.”).  
 2. See Shane, supra note 1, at A10 (“A review of classified agency 
documents obtained by Mr. Snowden and shared with The New York Times by 
The Guardian, offers a rich sampling of the agency’s global operations and 
culture.”). 
 3. See id. at A10 (describing the shock and outrage of the American public 
at the sheer magnitude of bulk data collection).  
 4. Id. at A1.  
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at A1, A10 (describing the NSA’s bulk data collection); see also 
Peter Maass, How Laura Poitras Helped Snowden Spill His Secrets, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Aug. 13, 2013, at MM22 (describing Snowden’s disclosures to 
documentarian Laura Poitras); Charlie Savage, C.I.A. Ties to AT&T Add Another 
Side to Spy Debate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 2013, at A5 (“The C.I.A. is paying 
AT&T more than $10 million a year to assist with overseas counterterrorism 
investigations by exploiting the company’s vast database of phone records, which 
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the NSA created a system that enabled it to easily access Yahoo 
and Google accounts.7 The end result was that the NSA intercepted 
some 182 million communication records, including “to” and “from” 
e-mail information, as well as text, audio, and video information.8  
The cybersurveillance program was shrouded in secrecy in 
that U.S. governmental officials were neither open nor truthful 
regarding the size and scope of the NSA program. For example, 
President Obama assured the U.S. public that the NSA was not 
targeting ordinary U.S. citizens, but rather was focused only on 
communications from individuals who posed a terrorist threat to 
the United States (for example, communications of “foreign 
intelligence value”9 and foreign intelligence targets).10 The 
President also boldly proclaimed, “Nobody is listening to your 
telephone calls.”11 Likewise, the NSA declared that it was not 
storing private online or phone information except under limited 
circumstances: when it believed that the recording or transcript 
contained “foreign intelligence information,” evidence of a possible 
crime, a “threat of serious harm to life or property,” or could shed 
“light on technical issues like encryption or vulnerability to cyber 
attacks.”12 However, it soon became clear that the NSA had 
established a huge data storage center (taking advantage of the 
                                                                                                     
includes Americans' international calls.”). 
 7. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Hacks Yahoo, Google: 
Global Data Links Expose Untold Millions of Accounts, COURIER-J., Oct. 31, 2013, 
at A1 (describing a project called MUSCULAR that the NSA used to secretly 
break into Yahoo and Google data centers around the world). 
 8. See Martha Mendoza, Reagan’s Order Led to NSA’s Broader Spying, 
COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2013, at A19, c.1–6 (“With the cooperation of foreign 
allies, the NSA is potentially gaining access to every email sent or received abroad 
from Google and Yahoo’s email services, as well as anything in GoogleDocs, Maps 
or Voice, according to a series of articles in the Washington Post.”).   
 9.  See Scott Shane, Documents Detail Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2014, at A9 (“N.S.A. officers who intercept an American online or on the phone—
say, while monitoring the phone or e-mail of a foreign diplomat or a suspected 
terrorist—can preserve the recording or transcript if they believe the contents 
include ‘foreign intelligence information’ or evidence of a possible crime.”); see also 
Mendoza, supra note 8, at A19, c.1 (“‘What NSA does is collect the 
communications of targets of feign intelligence value, irrespective of the provider 
that carries them,’ the agency said, likening the data channels at private firms to 
superhighways.”). 
 10. See generally Shane, supra note 9. 
 11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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declining cost of data storage and advances in search software)13 
and was routinely collecting extraordinarily large amounts of 
information regarding virtually everyone.14 As a result, even if 
Americans were not the intended targets of NSA eavesdropping, 
they routinely fell “into the agency’s global net.”15 
The NSA surveillance program raises fundamental questions 
regarding the relationship between the U.S. government and the 
U.S. citizenry. Undoubtedly, government has a legitimate interest 
in investigating and collecting information regarding suspected 
terrorists. Government also has a legitimate interest in shielding 
certain types of information (for example, state secrets or vital 
information that is potentially damaging to national security or 
foreign relations) from public disclosure.16 However, the question 
is one of balance. In a democratic society, legitimate questions 
might be raised regarding whether the government should be 
involved in such broad-based surveillance, and whether it should 
be conducting such operations in secret without democratic 
accountability. 
I. The Founding Generation’s Skepticism of Government: 
“Separation of Powers” and “Checks and Balances” 
The NSA cybersurveillance program raises a host of troubling 
issues for U.S. citizens. Although the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution embraced (to a greater or lesser extent) democratic 
principles, they remained highly distrustful of a powerful 
government—even a democratically elected one.17 Illustrative 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Scott Shane & David E. Sanger, Job Title Key to Inner Access Held 
by Leaker, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2013, at A1 (“That is evidently what gave birth to 
a vast data storage center that the N.S.A. is building in Utah, exploiting the 
declining cost of storage and the advance of sophisticated search software.”). 
 14. See generally Shane, supra note 9. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (ordering President 
Nixon to release information, but noting that confidentiality regarding the 
President’s conversations and correspondence is generally privileged, and further 
noting that this privilege is “fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution”). 
 17. See RALPH KETCHAM, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND THE COMPROMISES THAT 
GAVE BIRTH TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT at xv (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) 
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were the views of Thomas Paine, who argued, “Society in every 
state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a 
necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one.”18  
This distrust was probably rooted in a variety of 
considerations. First, the American Revolution was precipitated by 
grievances against the British government, and in particular 
alleged abuses by the British monarch.19 Indeed, the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence details a long list of purported 
grievances against, and alleged abuses by, the British King.20 Not 
only had British officials imposed restrictions on freedom of 
expression,21 but they had also conducted aggressive searches and 
                                                                                                     
(“Uncertain that any government over so vast a domain as the United States could 
be controlled by the people, the anti-federalists saw in the enlarged powers of the 
central government only the familiar threats to the rights and liberties of the 
people.”). 
 18. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 3 (Dover Publ’ns 1997) (1776). In full, the 
quotation reads as follows:  
Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best 
state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one; for 
when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a government, 
which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity 
is heightened by reflecting that we furnish the means by which we 
suffer.  
Id. 
 19. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (listing 
grievances against the English King). In fact, the British Parliament, rather than 
the King, committed some of the alleged offenses. 
 20. See id. para. 2 (asserting that the King of Great Britain had engaged in 
“a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the 
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States”). The Declaration 
contains a long list of grievances, including the following:  
He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of 
Officers to harrass [sic] our people, and eat out their substance.  He 
has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the 
Consent of our legislatures. . . . He has abdicated Government here, by 
declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. . . . He 
has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and 
destroyed the lives of our people. 
Id. 
 21. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, FROM GUTENBERG TO THE INTERNET: FREE 
SPEECH, ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY 190–91 
(2013) (“Previously, in 1606, England had created the crime of seditious libel in 
the Star Chamber’s decision in de Libellis Famosis. That decision replaced, in 
part, the criminal offense of constructive treason, and made it a crime to criticize 
the government or government officials . . . .”). 
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seizures.22 However, there was perhaps a second reason for the 
new Americans to be fearful of governmental power: many in the 
founding generation, or their ancestors, had emigrated from 
Europe to the American colonies in an effort to escape religious 
persecution.23 Some European nations had created “established” 
religions, required everyone to support those religions, and 
aggressively persecuted those who tried to practice other 
religions.24  
Even though the Declaration of Independence made clear that 
the power to govern flows from the “consent of the governed,” the 
early Americans did not embrace democracy unequivocally. They 
instead sought to impose limits on governmental power. Relying 
on principles from the Enlightenment,25 including the writings of 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, Privacy and Advancing 
Technology, 80 MISS. L.J. 1131, 1132 (2011) (“Colonial officials had also used 
‘general warrants’ that required them only to specify an offense, and then left it 
to the discretion of executing officials to decide which persons should be arrested 
and which places should be searched.”). 
 23. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1947) 
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from 
Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them to support 
and attend government favored churches. Catholics had persecuted 
Protestants, Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects 
had persecuted other Protestant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief 
had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief, and all of these 
had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to 
whatever religious group happened to be on top and in league with the 
government of a particular time and place, men and women had been 
fined, cast in jail, cruelly tortured, and killed. Among the offenses for 
which these punishments had been inflicted were such things as 
speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers of government-
established churches, nonattendance at those churches, expressions of 
non-belief in their doctrines, and failure to pay taxes and tithes to 
support them. 
 24. See id. at 10 (“And all of these dissenters were compelled to pay tithes 
and taxes to support government-sponsored churches whose ministers preached 
inflammatory sermons designed to strengthen and consolidate the established 
faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.”). 
 25. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 16–17 (1967) 
Despite the efforts that have been made to discount the ‘glittering 
generalities’ of the European Enlightenment on eighteenth-century 
Americans, their influence remains, and is profoundly illustrated in 
the political literature. It is not simply that the great virtuosi of the 
American Enlightenment—Franklin, Adams, Jefferson—cited the 
classic Enlightenment texts and fought for the legal recognition of 
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individuals such as John Locke,26 Thomas Paine,27 and Baron de 
Montesquieu,28 the Framers of the U.S. Constitution sought to 
create a system where governmental power was limited and 
constrained. Perhaps the most significant restraint was the 
doctrine of “separation of powers.” The French philosopher Baron 
de Montesquieu is credited with articulating the doctrine in his 
landmark essay, The Spirit of the Laws: 
[There] is no liberty [if] the judiciary power be not separated 
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the 
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed 
to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator.  
                                                                                                     
natural rights and for the elimination of institutions and practices 
associated with the ancient régime. . . . The ideas and writings of the 
leading secular thinkers of the European Enlightenment—reformers 
and social critics like Voltaire, Rousseau, and Beccaria as well as 
conservative analysts like Montesquieu – were quoted everywhere in 
the colonies, by everyone who claimed a broad awareness. In pamphlet 
after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on natural rights and 
on the social and governmental contract, Montesquieu and later 
Delolme on the character of British liberty and on the institutional 
requirements for its attainment, Voltaire on the evils of clerical 
oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal law, Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Burlamaqui, and Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on 
the principles of civil government. 
 26. See Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective 
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. 
L. REV. 52, 57, 64–65 (1985) (concluding that it “would be difficult to overstate 
John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the people who created 
the government that followed it” and outlining the influence of Locke on American 
political thought); David Thomas Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and 
the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 250, 262 (2008) (noting that 
“Jefferson followed Locke in justifying for the American colonies of 1776 the right 
of armed resistance”). 
 27. See Allen Edward Shoenberger, Connecticut Yankee Speech in Europe’s 
Court: An Alternative Vision of Constitutional Defamation Law to New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan?, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 431, 432 (2010) (“Free speech, such 
as that exemplified by the speeches and pamphlets of the revolutionary firebrand 
Thomas Paine, has been at the center of American civil rights.” (citing  HARVEY J. 
KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION (2000))). 
 28. See Douglass Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David 
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, reprinted in DOUGLASS ADAIR, 
FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93, 95 (1974) (“By the middle of the [eighteenth] 
century the French judge and philosophe Montesquieu had produced a 
compendium of the behavioral sciences, cutting across all these fields in his 
famous study of The Spirit of the Laws.”). 
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Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression. 
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or 
the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise 
those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the 
public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.29  
The Framers interspersed both “separation of powers” and 
“checks and balances” principles throughout the U.S. 
Constitution.30 Even though Congress was given the power to 
enact legislation, the Constitution required the President’s 
signature as a prerequisite to enactment (unless Congress 
overrides the President’s veto or the President allows the act to 
become law without his signature).31 The President has the power 
to appoint “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States,” but he can do so only “with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate.”32 There are many other examples of shared powers: 
although Congress and the President jointly enact legislation, the 
judiciary is frequently charged with interpreting that legislation 
and sometimes with striking it down.33 Moreover, many powers, 
such as the foreign affairs power, are shared between the President 
and Congress.34 For example, the Senate is charged with ratifying 
                                                                                                     
 29. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 151 (Cosimo Classics 2011) 
(1750). 
 30. See KETCHAM, supra note 17, at xv (“Also, mindful of colonial experience 
and following the arguments of Montesquieu, the idea that the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers had to be ‘separated,’ made to ‘check and balance’ 
each other in order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance.”). 
 31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3  
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a 
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the 
United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved 
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and 
Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
 32. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 33. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the 
Court’s power of judicial review of legislative actions). 
 34. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) 
(finding that because “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation,” Congress may provide the President with greater 
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treaties, which the Constitution charges the President to negotiate 
and make,35 but only the entire Congress can declare war.36 The 
President is integrally involved in other foreign affairs issues as 
well.37 In addition, the Framers created different terms of office for 
different officials so that a single election could not dramatically 
shift the course and direction of government.38 Citations to 
Montesquieu’s arguments regarding separation of powers appear 
in the Federalist Papers39 and the debates at the constitutional 
convention.40 Moreover, the doctrines of “separation of powers” and 
“checks and balances” are frequently cited and discussed in early 
documents.41  
The NSA cybersurveillance program raises fundamental 
issues regarding separation of powers. Unquestionably, every 
branch of government is involved with the program to some extent. 
Congress passed legislation authorizing the program, and the 
                                                                                                     
discretion in external matters than would be afforded domestically).  
 35. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He [the President] shall have Power, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.”). 
 36. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to declare 
War.”). 
 37. See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319 (“The President is the sole 
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with 
foreign nations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for 
six Years. . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.  He shall hold his Office during the 
Term of four Years. . . .”); see also KETCHAM, supra note 17, at xvii (“Thus, for 
example, even though an upper and a lower house might each eventually derive 
from the people, different districts, different terms of office, different modes of 
election, and different definitions of authority would create balances of power.”). 
 39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), reprinted in ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, JOHN JAY & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 139 (Emereo 
Publ’g 2012) (“One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable 
adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the political maxim, 
that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate 
and distinct.”).   
 40. See KETCHAM, supra note 17, at 85, 237, 249, 253, 260, 288, 339, 360 
(referencing various arguments of Montesquieu regarding separation of powers). 
 41. See id. at 159–60, 163, 166–67, 240, 247, 259–60, 357 (discussing the 
doctrines of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”).  
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President and his subordinates were charged with carrying it out. 
In addition, the judiciary, albeit secret courts, were charged with 
issuing warrants allowing the NSA to take various types of action. 
Secrecy was enhanced by the fact that the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) of 197842 provided that applications for 
search warrants would be governed by two courts whose orders 
were classified as “secret.”43 However, there is evidence suggesting 
that the NSA actively sought to evade the checks and balances 
built into the U.S. system. Not only was the NSA not forthcoming 
with information, but NSA Director, James Clapper, even lied to 
Congress about the program.44 When he was asked whether the 
NSA was collecting “any type of data at all on millions or hundreds 
of millions of Americans,” he flatly stated, “No, sir. Not 
wittingly.”45 Clapper later sought to explain the lie by suggesting 
that it was the “most truthful” or “least untruthful” thing that he 
could say at the time.46 
II. The NSA and Democratic Accountability 
The NSA cybersurveillance also raises democratic 
accountability concerns. Of course, democratic principles have not 
always been in vogue. When the U.S. Constitution was created, 
                                                                                                     
 42. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012). 
 43. See id. § 1805(a)(3), (b) (outlining the requirements for a judge to issue 
an electronic surveillance search warrant).  
 44. See Editorial Board, Edward Snowden, Whistle Blower, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
2, 2014, at A18 (“[Snowden’s] leaks revealed that James Clapper Jr., the director 
of national intelligence, lied to Congress when testifying in March that the N.S.A. 
was not collecting data on millions of Americans. (There has been no discussion 
of punishment for that lie.)”); Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Leaker Denies 
Giving Secrets to China, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2013, at A5 (suggesting that 
Snowden decided to go public because Director Clapper had lied to the American 
public regarding the NSA data collection program); Andrew Rosenthal, Clapper 
and Carney Get Slippery on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES THE OPINION PAGES, (Oct. 
24, 2013), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/ clapper-and-carney-
get-slippery-on-surveillance/?_r=0 (last visited Oct. 20, 2015) (“James Clapper, 
the director of national intelligence who once excused a lie to Congress by 
explaining that it was ‘the most truthful or least untruthful’ thing he could say, 
issued another burst of fog . . .  .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
 45. Savage & Shane, supra note 44. 
 46. Rosenthal, supra note 44. 
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monarchy was the dominant form of government in Europe. At one 
point, some monarchies tried to justify their existence through the 
concept of “Divine Right,”47 the idea that monarchs have been 
placed on their thrones by God; are divinely inspired and guided; 
and are carrying out God’s will through their actions.48 Of course, 
if a King is carrying out God’s will, there is no legitimate place for 
democratic accountability. After all, why would society allow 
common people to criticize what God has done or allow them to 
hold the monarch accountable for God’s actions?  
Because of these views, many monarchies imposed speech 
restrictions. Indeed, following Johannes Gutenberg’s development 
of the printing press in the fifteenth century,49 some governments 
actively restricted the ability of ordinary people to use the printing 
press to communicate ideas.50 In addition to placing limits on the 
total number of presses that could exist,51 governments also 
imposed licensing restrictions on the content of publications.52 
                                                                                                     
 47.  However, many in the founding generation rejected the notion of Divine 
Right altogether. See PAINE, supra note 18, at 6 (“There is something exceedingly 
ridiculous in the composition of monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means 
of information, yet empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is 
required.”). Thomas Paine, who was British born, but who was in the American 
colonies during the Revolutionary period and who wrote extensively, expressed 
serious reservations regarding the British monarchy’s claim to rule by Divine 
Right:  
[N]o man in his senses can say that [the British monarchs’ claim to the 
throne] under William the Conquerer is a very honorable one.  A 
French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establishing 
himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain 
terms a very paltry rascally original.—It certainly hath no divinity in 
it.  
Id. at 13–14.  
 48. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (noting that 
“centuries ago” there was a “belief that the monarch served by divine right”). 
 49. See DAVID CROWLEY & PAUL HEYER, COMMUNICATION IN HISTORY: 
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, SOCIETY 82 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the printing press 
revolution in the mid-fifteenth century). 
 50. See generally id. 
 51. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, CATHERINE HANCOCK, & JOHN C. KNECHTLE, THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 5 (4th ed. 2014) (“Even after 
the English licensing laws were abandoned, government retained the power to 
prosecute for seditious libel . . . .”). 
 52. See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002) (“The English 
licensing system expired at the end of the 17th century, but the memory of its 
abuses was still vivid enough in colonial times that Blackstone warned against 
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They also sometimes criminalized speech.53 For example, in 1606, 
England’s Star Chambers created the crime of seditious libel in de 
Libellis Famosis,54 thereby making it a crime to criticize the King 
and other governmental officials (and, at one point, the clergy as 
well).55 The crime was enforced by “threats of punishment, 
litigation costs, and stigma”56 and was justified by the notion that 
criticism of the government “inculcated a disrespect for public 
authority.”57 “Since maintaining a proper regard for government 
was the goal of the offense, it followed that truth was just as 
reprehensible as falsehood[,]” and therefore, truth was not a 
defense.58 Indeed, truthful criticisms were punished more severely 
than false criticisms on the assumption that truthful criticisms 
were potentially more damaging to the government.59 To those who 
                                                                                                     
the ‘restrictive power’ of such . . . an administrative official who enjoyed 
unconfined authority to pass judgment on the content of speech.”).  
 53. See generally de Libellis Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (defining and 
establishing the crime of seditious libel in England). 
 54. See generally id. (establishing seditious libel as a crime in England). 
 55. See William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: 
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior 
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 248 (1982) (“These Acts, 
unfortunately, did not adequately circumscribe the authority of these 
bureaucratic licensers. They enjoyed broad and vague powers to suppress the 
many false . . . scandalous, seditious and libelous works . . . published to the great 
defamation of Religion and government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Indeed, in de Libellis Famosis, the defendants had ridiculed high clergy. See de 
Libellis Famosis, (1606) 77 Eng.Rep. 250, at 251  
In the case of L. P. in the Star-Chamber this term, against whom the 
Attorney-General proceeded ore tenus on his own confession, for 
composing and publishing an infamous libel in verse, by which John 
Archbishop of Canterbury (who was a prelate of singular piety, gravity, 
and learning, now dead) by descriptions and circumlocutions, and not in 
express terms; and Richard Bishop of Canterbury who now is, were 
traduced and scandalized . . . . 
 56. William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom 
of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984). 
 57. Id. at 103; see also Matt J. O’Laughlin, Exigent Circumstances: 
Circumscribing the Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. REV. 707, 
720–21 (2002) (describing the arrest and imprisonment of John Wilkes for 
criticizing King George III). 
 58. Mayton, supra note 56, at 103. 
 59. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to 
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 184 
n.290 (1999) (“In fact, the English rule was that the greater the truth, the greater 
the libel.”). 
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regarded the concept of Divine Right as legitimate, such 
restrictions might have made sense.   
By the eighteenth century, when the United States was 
established, many European philosophers had become highly 
skeptical of monarchy, Divine Right, and hereditary succession,60 
and were openly questioning the legitimacy of monarchically based 
governmental systems.61 Thomas Paine, who was of British birth 
but who was living in the American colonies at the time of the 
Revolution, argued that monarchs become “poisoned by 
importance” and ultimately are “the most ignorant and unfit of any 
throughout the dominions.”62 He went on to note:  
                                                                                                     
 60. See, e.g., PAINE, supra note 18, at 12–13 (calling hereditary succession 
“an insult and an imposition on posterity”). Paine elaborated:  
For all men being originally equals, no one by birth could have a right 
to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all others for 
ever. . . . Most wise men, in their private sentiments, have ever treated 
hereditary right with contempt; yet it is one of those evils, when once 
established is not easily removed.  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 61. See id. at 8  
But there is another and greater distinction for which no truly natural 
or religious reason can be assigned, and that is, the distinction of men 
into KINGS and SUBJECTS. Male and female are the distinctions of 
nature, good and bad the distinctions of heaven, but how a race of men 
came into the world so exalted above the rest, and distinguished like 
some new species, is worth enquiring into, and whether they are the 
means of happiness or misery to mankind. 
Paine continued:  
As the exalting [of] one man so greatly above the rest cannot be 
justified on the equal rights of nature, so neither can it be defended on 
the authority of scripture; for the will of the Almighty, as declared by 
Gideon and the prophet Samuel, expressly disapproves of government 
by kings.  
Id. at 9.  
 62. Id. at 15. In full, the quotation reads as follows:  
Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, some 
grow insolent; selected from the rest of mankind their minds are early 
poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially 
from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of 
knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to the government 
are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the 
dominions. 
Id. 
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How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, 
and always obliged to check?  Such a power could not be the gift of 
a wise people, neither can any power, which needs checking, be 
from God; yet the provision, which the [British] constitution 
makes, supposes such a power to exist.63 
In establishing the United States, the founding generation 
rejected monarchy and Divine Right as justifiable bases for 
governmental authority.64 Inspired by such documents as Cato’s 
Letters,65 and the thoughts of European philosophers such as Locke,66 
                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).  
 64. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) 
(“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”). 
 65. See Michael Kent Curtis, St. George Tucker and the Legacy of Slavery, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1157, 1206 (2006) (“Cato’s Letters were a series of essays on 
liberty that were widely circulated in the colonies and the United States both 
before and after the Revolution.”); Dan Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual 
and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era State Declarations of Rights 
of Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 970 (2002) (“The 
description of the freedom of the press as a ‘bulwark of liberty’ apparently 
originates with Cato’s Letters, a series of essays by two English pamphleteers, 
widely reprinted and quoted in the American colonies.”); Paige Gold, Fair Use and 
the First Amendment: Corporate Control of Copyright is Stifling Documentary-
Making and Thwarting the Aims of the First Amendment, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 12 (2006) (“John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, two widely-read 
British political thinkers whose essays were published in the colonies as Cato’s 
Letters, identified three central values that the right of free speech is designed to 
advance . . . .”). 
 66. See Doernberg, supra note 26, at 64–65 (concluding that it “would be 
difficult to overstate John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the 
people who created the government that followed it”); Konig, supra note 26, at 
262 (noting that “Jefferson followed Locke in justifying for the American colonies 
of 1776 the right of armed resistance”). 
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Paine,67 and Baron de Montesquieu,68 they implicitly rejected the 
notion of Divine Right in the Declaration of Independence and opted 
for an entirely new basis for the exercise of governmental authority: 
“Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.”69 In addition, they embraced the 
idea of self-determination: “If an existing government becomes 
repressive, the people have the right to throw it off and replace it 
with another form of government that seems most likely to effect 
their Safety and Happiness.”70 In other words, power flows from 
the people to the government, rather than the other way around.71 
Granted, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not fully 
and unequivocally embrace democracy. Under the Constitution, 
U.S. Senators were not directly elected by the people of the United 
States.72 Rather, they were chosen by the state legislatures.73 Even 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Shoenberger, supra note 27, at 432 (“Free speech, such as that 
exemplified by the speeches and pamphlets of the revolutionary firebrand 
Thomas Paine, has been at the center of American civil rights.” (citing HARVEY J. 
KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION (2000))); see also IRVING 
FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION: SIX INFORMATION REVOLUTIONS 49 
(1997)  
Over the course of a century that began with the Industrial Revolution, 
the American Revolution and the French Revolution, the Western 
World underwent a tremendous alteration. Printing played a 
significant role in all three revolutions . . . . Pamphlets such as Tom 
Paine’s Common Sense spread the revolt to the American Revolution. 
And printing awakened France and shook all of Europe with its 
Declaration of the Rights of Man.   
 68. See Adair, supra note 28, at 95 (“By the middle of the [eighteenth] 
century the French judge and philosophe Montesquieu had produced a 
compendium of the behavioral sciences, cutting across all these fields in his 
famous study of The Spirit of the Laws.”). 
 69. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Emps. 
of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 
279, 323 (1973) (“Our discomfort with sovereign immunity, born of systems of 
divine right that the Framers abhorred, is thus entirely natural.”). 
 70. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 71. See Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 322–23 (“‘We the People’ 
formed the governments of the several States. Under our constitutional system, 
therefore, a State is not the sovereign of its people. Rather, its people are 
sovereign.”). 
 72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature 
thereof . . . .”). 
 73. See id. (declaring that the Senate shall be chosen by the legislature of 
each state). 
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today, the President is not directly elected but is chosen through 
the Electoral College.74 Moreover, through the concepts of 
separation of powers and checks and balances, the Framers sought 
to restrain and control the exercise of governmental authority. 
Finally, the people of the United States demanded inclusion of a 
Bill of Rights as part of the constitutional structure.75 
Despite the distrust of government, over time the concept of 
democracy took root in the United States, and the Declaration of 
Independence’s focus on the “consent of the governed” has gained 
ascendance. In addition, the notion that individuals have the right 
to freely debate the wisdom of governmental actions, as well as the 
merits (or demerits) of candidates for political office, is well 
accepted. As democratic principles began to take root, and 
monarchy was supplanted or limited by democracy, speech 
restrictions became anathema to the nature of government. In a 
democracy, the ultimate check on governmental authority comes 
from the electorate’s ability to choose their representatives.76 
Criticism of governmental officials and governmental actions and 
the concept of democratic accountability lie at the heart of the U.S. 
governmental system and require a degree of governmental 
transparency and openness.  
Of course, the fundamental dilemma presented by the NSA 
data collection program is that it was (before the Snowden 
disclosures) conducted almost entirely in secret. Governmental 
officials deceived the American public regarding the nature and 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–3 (declaring that each state shall appoint electors 
who vote for the president). 
 75. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010) (“But those 
who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional 
rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”). 
 76. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of 
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (discussing the importance of the people’s 
ability to vote for representatives to checking the power of the government); 
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1 (1971) (same); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (same); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First 
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (same); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, 
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10–13 (5th ed. 2014) (same). 
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scope of that program.77 They even lied to Congress.78 Secrecy was 
paramount. The government issued National Security Letters to 
large telecommunications companies, requiring them to turn over 
data to the NSA and ordering the companies not to publicly 
acknowledge the letters or the disclosures, or even alert their 
customers regarding the nature and scope of NSA inquiries.79 NSA 
search warrants were (and are) issued by secret courts, and the 
warrants and the court orders were (and are) classified as “secret” 
and withheld from the public.80 To the extent that individuals 
attempted to challenge the NSA program in court, they were met 
with more secrecy.81 
In other words, it was extremely difficult for the public to 
ascertain the nature or scope of the operation, much less to hold 
governmental officials accountable. Of course, government may 
have a legitimate basis for classifying certain types of documents 
as “secret” and for shielding them from public view. Even in a 
democracy, not everything should be publicly available. However, 
the extent of NSA’s secrecy went beyond permissible bounds. In a 
democratic society, premised on the consent of the governed, 
society must have some opportunity to debate and evaluate the 
legitimacy of the NSA surveillance program, as well as to establish 
appropriate limitations on governmental power. Even though some 
aspects of the program might justifiably be shielded from public 
disclosure to protect national security, the extraordinary level of 
secrecy associated with the NSA’s cybersurveillance program is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the demands and expectations of 
                                                                                                     
 77. See generally Shane, supra note 9 (describing President Obama’s 
reassurance that the NSA was not listening to the American people’s phone calls). 
 78. See Editorial Board, supra note 44, at A18 (describing director of national 
security James Clapper’s lie to Congress that the NSA was not knowingly 
collecting data on millions of Americans); see generally Rosenthal, supra note 44.   
 79. See Shane, supra note 1, at A10 (“The agency, using a combination of 
jawboning, stealth and legal force, has turned the nation’s Internet and 
telecommunications companies into collection partners, installing filters in their 
facilities, serving them with court orders, building back doors into their software 
and acquiring keys to break their encryption.”); Stanglin, supra note 1 (discussing 
how the NSA forced companies to maintain the secrecy of its spying program). 
 80. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3), (b) (2012) (outlining the requirements for a 
judge to issue an electronic surveillance search warrant).  
 81. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) 
(holding that Amnesty International lacked standing to challenge FISA). 
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a free society. The question is one of balance, and there was no 
balance with the NSA program. Secrecy pervaded the program, 
ignoring and trampling the concept of democratic accountability. 
Absent the Snowden disclosures, the public might still be unaware 
of the nature or extent of the program. At least now, in light of 
those disclosures, the nation is able to debate the propriety and 
scope of the surveillance program. 
III. The Fourth Amendment as a Limitation on the NSA 
Surveillance Program 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution82 provides a 
potential check on the NSA surveillance program. Interestingly, 
even though the Framers of the U.S. Constitution viewed the 
concepts of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances” as 
sufficient, in and of themselves, to protect the people against 
governmental abuse, many of the people did not. As a result, when 
the Framers of the U.S. Constitution decided not to include a bill 
of rights on the theory that they had created a government of 
limited and enumerated powers and one whose power would be 
sufficiently checked by the doctrines of separation of powers and 
checks and balances, the people balked.83 It rapidly became clear 
that the Constitution might not have enough support to gain 
ratification without the addition of a bill of rights. In an effort to 
salvage the process, proponents urged ratification of the 
Constitution “as is,” but promised that the first Congress would 
create what became the Bill of Rights.84 Only then was ratification 
possible.85 As a result, the Bill of Rights entered the Constitution 
                                                                                                     
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 83. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the 
Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification 
was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general 
Government carried with it a potential for tyranny.”). 
 84. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 769 (2010) (“But those 
who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe traditional 
rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”). 
 85. See id. (discussing the states’ insistence on the adoption of a bill of rights 
as a condition for the Constitution’s ratification); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The first 10 Amendments were not 
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as a series of amendments rather than as a part of the Constitution 
itself.86 
An essential component of the Bill of Rights was the Fourth 
Amendment, which limited the government’s authority to conduct 
searches and seizures.87 Abuses during the British colonial period 
motivated the founding generation’s push for Fourth Amendment 
protections.88 British colonial officials had used Writs of Assistance 
that required them to do no more than specify the object of a search 
to obtain a warrant that allowed them to search any place where 
the evidence might be found.89 There was no limit as to place or 
duration.90 Colonial officials had also used “general warrants” that 
required them only to specify an offense and then left it to the 
discretion of those officials to decide which persons should be 
arrested and which places should be searched.91 
                                                                                                     
enacted because the members of the First Congress came up with a bright idea 
one morning; rather, their enactment was forced upon Congress by a number of 
the States as a condition for their ratification of the original Constitution.”). 
 86. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (discussing how the Bill of Rights only 
entered the Constitution because states insisted upon it as a condition for 
ratification). 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”). 
 88. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64–
65 (3d ed. 2008) (“The debate (and the anger) in the American colonies about the 
arbitrary use of these writs of assistance by the English ‘was perhaps the most 
prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the 
oppressions of the mother country.”’ (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
625 (1886))); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) 
(“[T]he driving force behind the adoption of the [Fourth] Amendment . . . was 
widespread hostility among the former Colonists to the issuance of writs of 
assistance. . . . [T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people 
of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”). 
 89. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1131–227 (describing the use of Writs of 
Assistance to search people and property with wide discretion). 
 90. See id. (noting the lack of limitations or restrictions on the Writs of 
Assistance). 
 91. See id. at 1132 (“Colonial officials had also used ‘general warrants’ that 
required them only to specify an offense, and then left it to the discretion of 
executing officials to decide which persons should be arrested and which places 
should be searched.”). 
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In the Fourth Amendment, the founding generation sought to 
cabin the new government’s authority to engage in searches and 
seizures and limit the possibilities for abuse. In general, the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and 
seizures.92 Although that Amendment does not mandate the 
issuance of a search warrant as a precondition to a search, it does 
provide that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”93 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly protect 
individual privacy, it did seek to protect people, as well as their 
houses, papers, and effects.94 
Although the Fourth Amendment has generally provided the 
citizenry with substantial protections against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures,”95 the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to 
deal with the problem of advancing technology like that being used 
by the NSA.96 Part of the problem is that the state of technology 
was far less advanced in the eighteenth century so that the authors 
of the Fourth Amendment were not concerned with cyber-searches, 
but instead were worried about actual physical searches of persons 
and places.97 As a result, Supreme Court precedent had historically 
                                                                                                     
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects . . . shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 95. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (holding that the 
search of the defendant's vehicle while he was handcuffed in a patrol car was 
unreasonable); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the 
warrantless use of thermal imaging technology to “see” what was going on inside 
a home was unreasonable); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (holding 
that police exceeded the limits of an investigative stop when they asked defendant 
to accompany them to a small police room, retained his ticket and driver’s license, 
and in no way indicated that he was free to depart); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
654 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained by unconstitutional search was 
inadmissible). 
 96. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1137 (“[E]arly United States Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with technology and the Fourth Amendment . . . were 
virtually unresponsive (except in the dissents) to the problems presented by new 
technologies.”). 
 97. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 308 n.1 (1959) (“The Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides: ‘The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
1226 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1207 (2015) 
tended to limit the Fourth Amendment’s application to situations 
in which the police actually searched a person98 or trespassed onto 
a “constitutionally protected area.”99 The Court’s approach became 
problematic as technology advanced to the point that the police 
could infringe privacy interests without actually trespassing or 
intruding into a constitutionally protected area.100 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, as electricity came 
into widespread use and new technologies were invented, the 
Court began to confront situations in which the police or 
governmental officials would aggressively use technology in police 
investigations.101 In these early cases, the Court was dealing with 
relatively crude technologies such as “detectaphones,”102 “spike 
mikes,”103 and wiretaps.104 Except when the technology actually 
penetrated into a “constitutionally protected area,” such as a home 
(for example, in the case of the spike mike which was inserted into 
someone’s home to overhear conversations inside the home),105 the 
Court refused to hold that the use of such technologies to spy on 
                                                                                                     
 98. See id. at 314 (holding that an agent had probable cause and reasonable 
grounds for believing that the defendant was violating federal laws on narcotic 
drugs, and therefore heroin discovered in search incident to lawful arrest was 
competent evidence). 
 99.  See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding “that 
the use of the detectaphone by Government agents was not a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“We 
think, therefore, that the wire tapping here disclosed did not amount to a search 
or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 100. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1137 (“[E]arly United States Supreme 
Court decisions dealing with technology and the Fourth Amendment . . . were 
virtually unresponsive (except in the dissents) to the problems presented by new 
technologies.”). 
 101. See id. (describing the Court’s early struggles with application of the 
Fourth Amendment to emerging police technologies such as wiretapping). 
 102. See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134 (“We hold that what was heard by the use 
of the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry.”). 
 103. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (noting “the 
officers employed a so-called ‘spike mike’ to listen to what was going on within 
the four walls of the house next door”). 
 104. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding “that the wire tapping here 
disclosed did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment”). 
 105. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (holding that the use of spike mikes 
violated the Fourth Amendment). 
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citizens constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.106 
However, by the early part of the twentieth century, individual 
justices were beginning to raise concerns regarding the potentially 
adverse impact of intrusive technologies on individual privacy. In 
Olmstead v. United States,107 with a degree of prescience, a 
dissenting Justice Brandeis argued that the “progress of 
science . . . is not likely to stop with wire tapping,” and may some 
day allow the government “without removing papers from secret 
drawers” to “expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the 
home.”108 Justice Brandeis argued that, rather than inquiring 
whether the government has intruded into a “constitutionally 
protected area,” the courts should focus on whether government 
had trampled on the “indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property.”109 In Goldman v. United 
States,110 a dissenting Justice Murphy relied on Justice Brandeis 
and Samuel Warren’s seminal article on privacy111 to argue that 
the Fourth Amendment should be broadly interpreted to protect 
“the individual against unwarranted intrusions by others into his 
private affairs,”112 and that the Court should provide greater 
protection for individual privacy.113 Despite these dissents, the 
Court continued to focus on whether government had intruded into 
a “constitutionally protected area.”  
By the second half of the twentieth century, the Court itself 
was becoming more sensitive to the intrusive possibilities of newer 
                                                                                                     
 106. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (holding that the 
use of a detectaphone did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the use of wire tapping did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 107. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 108. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 474–75. 
 110. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 111. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 112. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 136 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). 
 113. See id. at 139 (“Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished 
by . . . detectaphone . . . , or by new methods of photography . . . , the privacy of 
the citizen is equally invaded by agents of the Government and intimate personal 
matters are laid bare to view.”). 
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technologies. In Silverman v. United States114 the Court expressed 
concern in dicta regarding “the Fourth Amendment implications of 
these and other frightening paraphernalia which the vaunted 
marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society.”115 A 
mere six years later, the Court rendered its landmark decision in 
Katz v. United States116 and mapped out a completely new 
approach for handling advancing technologies under the Fourth 
Amendment. Instead of asking whether the police had intruded 
into a “constitutionally protected area” (which, of course, would 
still constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment), the Court inquired whether the government had 
violated an individual’s “expectation of privacy.”117 A concurring 
Justice Harlan essentially agreed with the Court but argued that 
the expectation of privacy must be one that society recognizes as 
“reasonable.”118 The Harlan formulation was the one that the 
Court ultimately adopted.  
The Katz test seemingly expanded the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to advancing technologies. In that case, Katz made a 
phone call from a telephone booth, and the police overheard the 
conversation because of a listening device attached to the outside 
of the booth.119 Based on prior precedent, the prosecution argued 
that there had been no intrusion into a “constitutionally protected 
area” because a phone booth was not a protected area (like a 
home).120 Moreover, the government had not “trespassed” into the 
                                                                                                     
 114. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 115. Id. at 509. 
 116. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 117. See id. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what 
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”). 
 118. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”).   
 119. See id. at 348 (majority opinion) (discussing “evidence of the petitioner’s 
end of telephone conversation, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an 
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone 
booth from which he had placed his calls”). 
 120. See id. at 351 (“The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was 
a ‘constitutionally protected area.’ The Government has maintained with equal 
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phone booth because it had simply attached a listening device to 
the outside to capture sound waves emanating from the booth.121 
Despite the absence of a trespass, the Court found that the 
government’s use of the listening device constituted a search 
because the government had violated Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy (REOP): “One who occupies [a phone booth], 
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to 
place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters 
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”122 
After Katz, one might have assumed that the Court had 
sufficiently restricted the government’s ability to use new 
technologies to intrude on personal privacy. However, as the Court 
struggled to apply the Katz formulation in subsequent cases, it 
rapidly became clear that the REOP test did not provide much 
protection against the onslaught of technology.123 Although the 
Court has rendered some post-Katz technology decisions that are 
privacy-protective,124 the general thrust of the Court’s 
jurisprudence has been largely search-permissive.125 The problem 
is that the Court has narrowly construed the REOP test in a way 
that provides little protection against electronic intrusions.126 
Indeed, in a number of cases, the Court has found that individuals 
do not have an REOP even though a reasonable person might very 
                                                                                                     
vigor that it was not.”). 
 121. See id. at 352 (“The Government contends, however, that the activities 
of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment 
requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical 
penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls.”). 
 122. Id.  
 123. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1138 (“[T]he Katz test has been narrowly 
construed and has not easily adapted to new technologies.”). 
 124. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (determining that 
the police may not search the electronic contents of an individual’s cell phone, 
incident to arrest, despite precedent suggesting that the police can search “closed 
containers” as part of such a search); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) 
(finding that the use of Forward Looking Infrared Technology to determine the 
amount of heat emanating from a home (to determine whether the owner might 
be using lights to grow marijuana in his attic) constituted a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 125. See Weaver, supra note 22, at 1138 (“Katz offered substantial hope to 
those who were concerned about the advance of technology and the potential 
implications for privacy. However, Katz has not lived up to that promise . . . .”). 
 126. See id. (discussing how the Katz test has been narrowly construed). 
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well have concluded otherwise. For example, the Court has held 
that individuals do not have an REOP in so-called “open fields” 
even if they are fenced and posted with “no trespassing” signs,127 
against helicopters hovering at low altitudes over their homes,128 
against surreptitious examination of garbage that they leave on 
the street for the garbage collector,129 against canine sniffs 
designed to uncover whether a passenger is carrying illegal drugs 
in a suitcase,130 or against the use of ground-tracking devices that 
are used to follow the movements of their automobiles131 (except 
when the device is used to uncover information about the inside of 
a home,132 or the police commit a trespass in installing the device 
on a vehicle133). 
                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields 
do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is 
intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (finding that an 
officer’s observation, with his naked eye, of the interior of a partially covered 
greenhouse in residential backyard from vantage point of helicopter circling 400 
feet above did not constitute a “search” for which a warrant was required); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that warrantless aerial 
observation of fenced-in backyard within curtilage of home was not unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 
239 (1986) (announcing that aerial photography of chemical company’s industrial 
complex was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.). 
 129. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 45 (1988) (determining 
that defendants did not have reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the 
Fourth Amendment in garbage which they placed in opaque bags outside their 
house for collection by trash collector). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (deciding that 
exposure of luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes). 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (finding that 
monitoring the signal of a beeper placed in a container of chemicals that were 
being transported to the owner’s cabin did not invade any legitimate expectation 
of privacy on the cabin owner’s part and, therefore, there was neither a “search” 
nor a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (explaining that 
the Government is not completely free to determine by means of electric device, 
without warrant and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, whether a 
particular article or person is in an individual’s home at particular time). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (announcing 
that attachment of Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to vehicle, 
and subsequent use of that device to monitor vehicle’s movements on public 
streets, was a search within meaning of Fourth Amendment). 
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Perhaps the most restrictive limitation on the Katz test comes 
from the notion that there is no REOP for information that is 
“voluntarily conveyed to a third party.”134 In Smith v. Maryland,135 
the Court held that the police did not violate an individual’s REOP 
when it installed a pen register that allowed them to mechanically 
record all of the phone numbers dialed by the individual.136 The 
recording was done at the phone company, rather than through an 
intrusion into the individual’s home, and the Court held that an 
individual has no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in things that 
he “voluntarily turns over to third parties,” including to the phone 
company’s mechanical equipment.137 Likewise, in United States v. 
Miller,138 the Court held that an individual did not retain an REOP 
in his bank records that were being held by his bank because they 
had been voluntarily turned over to a third party.139 Finally, in 
Couch v. United States,140 the Court held that a client could not 
claim an REOP in his own documents that were in the possession 
of a third party (his accountant).141 
                                                                                                     
 134. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that 
installation and use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute 
a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (determining that a bank depositor had no 
protectable Fourth Amendment interest in bank records, consisting of microfilms 
or checks, deposit slips, and other records relating to his accounts at two banks, 
maintained pursuant to Bank Secrecy Act and obtained by allegedly defective 
subpoenas); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (holding that, where 
taxpayer hired an independent accountant to whom she had delivered regularly 
over a period of years various business and tax records which remained in his 
continuous possession, taxpayer’s divestment of possession of such records 
disqualified her entirely as object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment 
compulsion). 
 135. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 136. See id. at 745–46 (“The installation and use of a pen register, 
consequently, was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”). 
 137. See id. at 774–75 (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily 
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that 
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, 
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers 
he dialed.”).  
 138. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 139. See id. at 440 (noting that Miller could not assert either ownership or 
possession over the records because the bank was required to keep them pursuant 
to its statutory obligations).  
 140. 409 U.S. 322 (1973). 
 141. See id. at 335 (“[T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records 
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If literally applied, the “voluntarily turned over to a third 
party” doctrine creates a gaping hole in the Fourth Amendment 
and suggests that the Fourth Amendment provides almost no 
protection against the NSA’s massive surveillance operation. In a 
modern, technologically driven society, most people convey a large 
amount of information through third parties. Emails are routinely 
sent through Internet service providers (ISPs), and text messages 
are routinely sent through service providers like Verizon, AT&T, 
and T-Mobile. Even phone calls are made through phone 
companies. Of course, Katz itself involved a phone call placed 
through the phone company, and the Court concluded that Katz 
was protected by an REOP.142 However, in light of decisions like 
Smith, Miller, and Couch, it is not clear that emails, phone calls, 
and text messages are accompanied by an REOP today. 
All is not lost. In recent years, the Court has shown somewhat 
greater sensitivity towards privacy issues. Indeed, in a couple of 
recent decisions, the Court has protected individuals against police 
attempts to use technology to obtain information regarding the 
interior of their homes. For example, in Kyllo v. United States,143 
the Court held that the police had violated a homeowner’s REOP 
when they used forward-looking infrared technology (FLIR) to 
determine the amount of heat emanating from his home.144 The 
police suspected, correctly as it turned out, that the occupants were 
using special lights to grow marijuana in their attic.145 The Court 
stated that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
                                                                                                     
are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the 
information therein is required in an income tax return.”). 
 142. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) (finding that the search 
and seizure would have been constitutional if it had been carried out with prior 
authorization from a magistrate that narrowly limited its scope).  
 143. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 144. See id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not 
in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
 145. See id. at 30 (“Agent Elliott concluded that petitioner was using halide 
lights to grow marijuana in his house, which indeed he was.”). 
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use.”146 Likewise, in Florida v. Jardines,147 the Court held that the 
police committed a search when they entered the curtilage of 
Jardines’ home to have a narcotics-detection dog sniff at an 
individual’s front door.148 However, in that case, the Court did not 
apply the REOP test but instead focused on the fact that the 
officers and the dog had committed a physical intrusion into the 
constitutionally protected area of the curtilage of defendant’s 
home.149 The difficulty is that, despite the Court’s protectiveness 
towards the home, it has provided little protection against 
governmental surveillance of communications sent from a person’s 
home.  
There are indications that some individual U.S. Supreme 
Court justices are becoming concerned regarding the intrusiveness 
of modern technologies.  For example, in City of Ontario v. Quon,150 
the Court suggested that it was uncomfortable with the results 
that the REOP test produced.151 Quon involved the question of 
whether a member of a police SWAT team possessed an REOP in 
text messages that he sent and received on a wireless pager that 
the City issued for his use for work-related purposes.152 The police 
department investigated the officer and others after they 
repeatedly exceeded their monthly limits on messages, seeking to 
determine whether the limits were too low or whether 
departmental rules related to non-work-related messages had 
been violated.153 The audit revealed that most of one officer’s 
messages were not work-related, and he was disciplined.154 He 
filed suit, arguing that the audit violated his Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 147. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 148. See id. at 1417–18 (focusing on a Fourth Amendment property rights 
baseline). 
 149. See id. at 1414–15 (describing curtilage as “an area adjacent to the home 
and to which the activity of home life extends”). 
 150. 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010). 
 151. See id. at 757 (discussing the test found in O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 
709 (1987) as an alternative to the one found in Katz). 
 152. See id. at 750–51 (explaining the purpose of the SWAT pagers was to 
assist the SWAT team in mobilization). 
 153. See id. at 752 (describing the text messages as public information that 
was available for auditing). 
 154. See id. (mentioning that some of the text messages were explicit in 
nature). 
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rights.155 In deciding the case, the Court assumed that Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his messages but expressed 
hesitance to establish fixed rules regarding the application of 
Fourth Amendment rules to emerging technologies: “The judiciary 
risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment 
implications of emerging technology before its role in society has 
become clear.”156 In some respects, this hesitance was staggering. 
After all, the Court had been struggling with the implications of 
technology for nearly a century.157  Of course, there was some sense 
in the Quon Court’s observations. As the Court noted, the 
“dynamics of communication and information transmission” are 
changing rapidly, as are societal expectations regarding what 
should be regarded as proper and improper behavior, and the 
Court worried about its ability to predict “how employees’ privacy 
expectations will be shaped by those changes or the degree to 
which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as 
reasonable.”158 
Another hopeful decision was rendered in Riley v. 
California,159 in which the Court held that the police could not 
routinely search digital information on a cell phone as part of a 
search incident to legal arrest.160 In one of the fact scenarios 
presented in that case, after an individual was stopped for driving 
with expired license plates and arrested, the police suspected that 
the arrestee was associated with gang activity and decided to 
search his smart phone.161 Although the Court reaffirmed the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception, the Court invalidated the 
                                                                                                     
 155. See id. at 753 (claiming, in addition to Fourth Amendment violations, the 
audit violated the Stored Communications Act). 
 156. Id. at 759. 
 157. See Lawrence Hurley, In U.S., When High-Tech Meets High Court, High 
Jinks Ensue, REUTERS (May 9, 2014, 1:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2014/05/09/us-usa-court-tech-idUSBREA480N420140509 (last visited 
June 5, 2015) (describing recent mishaps of Justices’ use of technological terms) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 158. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759–60 (2010). 
 159. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 160. See id. at 2485 (holding that officers must obtain warrants before 
conducting searches of cell phones). 
 161. See id. at 2480 (highlighting that the police found incriminating 
information regarding two gangs, the Crips and the Bloods).  
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search.162 In doing so, the Court emphasized that individuals are 
entitled to privacy against governmental intrusion into their 
private affairs and described smart phones as “minicomputers” 
that have the potential to function as telephones as well as 
“cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, 
libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, and newspapers,” and 
can contain “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or 
hundreds of videos.”163 As a result, using a smart phone, the “sum 
of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a 
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and 
descriptions,” can reveal a user’s Internet searches, browsing 
history, and personal movements.164 Consequently, the Court 
regarded a search of a smart phone as quite different than the use 
of the pen register in Smith v. Maryland.165 
In Riley, in evaluating the validity of the government’s action, 
the Court balanced “the degree [to which a search] intrudes upon 
an individual’s privacy” against “the degree to which it is needed 
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”166 Because 
the digital data “stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a 
weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s 
escape,” the Court concluded that the police could not search it 
except to determine whether it is being used to conceal a weapon 
(for example, a razor blade).167 Even though the Court was aware 
of the fact that a smart phone might be vulnerable to two different 
types of evidence destruction—remote wiping and data 
encryption—the Court viewed these concerns as remote given that 
the government had offered nothing more than a couple “of 
anecdotal examples of remote wiping triggered by an arrest.”168 
Regarding encryption, the Court noted that the police would have 
limited opportunities to search a password-protected phone 
                                                                                                     
 162. See id. at 2483 (explaining that cell phones found on arrestees do not 
pose a risk to officers and generally do not invoke exigency issues). 
 163. Id. at 2489. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 2492 (stating explicitly that Smith v. Maryland does not apply). 
 166. Id. at 2484. 
 167. See id. at 2485 (“Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any 
potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one.”). 
 168. See id. at 2486–87 (explaining that most phone screens would lock a few 
minutes after an arrest). 
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because smart phones “lock at the touch of a button or, as a default, 
after some very short period of inactivity.”169 In any event, the 
police can prevent remote wiping by disconnecting a phone from 
the network, which can happen by removing the battery or placing 
the phone in a bag that isolates it from receiving radio waves.170  If 
there is evidence suggesting that a remote wipe is imminent, the 
police may be able to establish “exigent circumstances” that would 
justify an immediate warrantless search.171 
Riley’s pro-privacy holding and statements offer U.S. citizens 
some hope that the Court will eventually provide individuals with 
protection against NSA surveillance of e-mail, text, and phone 
communications.172 However, the decision does not inevitably lead 
to that result.173 Even if the Court precludes the police from 
reviewing the contents of an individual’s smart phone, it might not 
go so far as to prohibit the NSA from accessing communications 
sent by an individual through an ISP or cell phone provider that is 
                                                                                                     
 169. See id. at 2486 
Moreover, in situations in which an arrest might trigger a remote-wipe 
attempt or an officer discovers an unlocked phone, it is not clear that 
the ability to conduct a warrantless search would make much of a 
difference. The need to effect the arrest, secure the scene, and tend to 
other pressing matters means that law enforcement officers may well 
not be able to turn their attention to a cell phone right away. . . . Cell 
phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an 
individual anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the 
phone is completed, which might be at the station house hours later. 
Likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not 
be able to begin his search in the short time remaining before the phone 
locks and data becomes encrypted.  
(citations omitted).  
 170. See id. at 2487 (describing new technology to prevent encryption, such as 
“Faraday bags”). 
 171. See id. at 2487–88 (outlining that a potential test regarding exigent 
circumstances in situations with imminent threats of data wipes is the 
reasonableness of the officer’s actions). 
 172. See Marc Rotenberg & Alan Butler, Symposium: In Riley v. California, a 
Unanimous Supreme Court Sets Out Fourth Amendment for Digital Age, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/ 
06/symposium-in-riley-v-california-a-unanimous-supreme-court-sets-out-fourth-
amendment-for-digital-age/ (last visited June 12, 2015) (“The Court’s opinion is 
Riley v. California signals a Court more prepared to engage in the challenges of 
the digital age ahead.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 173. See id. (explaining that the Court has not addressed this issue 
specifically). 
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remotely situated from the individual’s smart phone. As a result, 
Riley does not definitively resolve the Fourth Amendment issues 
raised by the NSA surveillance program and does not come to grips 
with the Court’s prior precedent, which suggests that there is no 
REOP in information that an individual voluntarily turns over to 
a third party, and it is unclear whether and how the Court will 
apply its precedent to smart phones and computers or to 
communications made through such devices.174  
Of course, even if the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence were construed broadly enough to allow an 
individual to challenge the government’s seizure of phone call 
information, texts, or emails, a potentially aggrieved individual 
might not be able to bring suit.175 For one thing, the individual may 
not be able to prove that he is under surveillance.176 As noted, when 
the NSA sends a National Security Letter to a telecommunications 
company, it usually includes an order precluding the company 
from publicly acknowledging the letters or the disclosures or even 
from alerting their customers.177 Moreover, to bring suit, 
individuals must be able to establish standing in the sense of 
establishing sufficient injury to satisfy the Article III case or 
controversy requirements.178 In Clapper v. Amnesty 
International,179 individuals who were the likely targets of NSA 
surveillance (they were providing legal representation to alleged 
terrorists who had been detained at Guantanamo Bay) sought to 
challenge the cybersurveillance program.180 However, because of 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Jay Stanley, How the Supreme Court Could Have Ruled in Riley, 
ACLU (Jun. 26, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/how-supreme-court-
could-have-ruled-riley (last visited July 10, 2015) (explaining that the Court could 
easily limit this decision in later cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 175. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 ISJLP 551, 
556 (2014) (describing one possible issue barring a Fourth Amendment claim: 
standing).  
 176. See id. at 567 (explaining that proving data surveillance is difficult in the 
absence of Snowden-like disclosures).   
 177. See generally Shane, supra note 1; Stanglin, supra note 1. 
 178. See generally Vladeck, supra note 175. 
 179. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 180. See id. at 1143 (highlighting the respondents’ argument that there was 
an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications would be acquired 
in the future). 
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the secrecy that pervaded the NSA program, plaintiffs were unable 
to prove that they were actual targets of the NSA program, and the 
Court concluded that they could not establish injury or standing to 
sue.181 Of course, the Court’s holding placed plaintiffs in an 
impossible situation.182 To have standing to sue, plaintiffs must be 
able to prove that the NSA is subjecting them to surveillance.183 
However, the government goes to great lengths to maintain secrecy 
and to preclude plaintiffs for knowing whether they are subject to 
surveillance.184 In Clapper, the plaintiffs asked that the 
Government be forced to reveal, through in camera proceedings, 
whether it was intercepting respondents’ communications and 
what targeting procedures it was using.185 The Court refused to 
require the Government to make this revelation, noting that the 
plaintiffs were required to establish standing by “pointing to 
specific facts” and that the Government was not required to 
“disprove standing by revealing details of its surveillance 
priorities.”186 The net effect was that, because the government’s 
surveillance program was super-secret, plaintiffs could not prove 
that they were under surveillance, and therefore they could not 
                                                                                                     
 181. See id. at 1147 (“[I]njury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a 
favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 
149  (2010))). 
 182. See Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple 
Error Decisions in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles 
v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 127, 130 (2014) (critiquing the Clapper 
decision because the Court used it to shelter large swathes of governmental 
conduct from the most effective forms of judicial review). 
 183. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013) (deciding that 
the respondents lacked standing because they “cannot demonstrate that the 
future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and because they 
cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent 
harm”). 
 184. See Jackson, supra note 182, at 142 (arguing “[w]hen a government in a 
democracy seeks to act in secret, the need for judicial review of the legality of 
statutes authorizing the secrecy should be deemed specially pressing”). 
 185. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1149 n.4 (questioning the practical 
implications of allowing a terrorist suspect to determine whether he or she was 
under government surveillance by filing a law suit). 
 186. See id. (focusing on which party must prove standing in government 
surveillance cases).  
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meet the case or controversy necessary to proceed with the 
litigation.187 
Conclusion 
Life, and rights, inevitably involve tradeoffs. Even skeptics of 
governmental power recognize the need to balance governmental 
interests and individual interests.188 Unquestionably, the 
individual interest in privacy, which Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
described as “the right most valued by civilized men,” and the 
interest in preventing governmental overreach and abuse are 
fundamental to life in a free society. However, they are not 
regarded as absolute.189 Moreover, the government has a 
compelling interest in gathering the information necessary to 
prevent future terrorist attacks.190 The question is whether the 
NSA surveillance program strikes the right balance between the 
governmental interest in protecting society and the individual 
interest in privacy.191  
Nevertheless, when viewed from a historical perspective, the 
NSA surveillance program can only be regarded as 
extraordinary.192 Although the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
                                                                                                     
 187. See Jackson, supra note 182, at 187 (concluding that the Clapper decision 
protecting secret government spying programs through standing hurts alleged 
victims, society, and even the Court). 
 188. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (analyzing the 
interests of both the government and individuals). 
 189. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (defining the 
most valued right as the right to be left alone by the government). 
 190.  See Matthew Silverman, National Security and the First Amendment: A 
Judicial Role in Maximizing Public Access to Information, 78 IND. L.J. 1101, 1111 
(2003) (“Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of 
information important to our national security and the appearance of 
confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence 
service.” (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3. (1980))). 
 191. See id. at 1124 (“The challenge to the judicial branch is to adapt in a way 
that preserves barriers to access where, in the interests of national security, 
access should not be granted, while taking steps to prevent the abuse of privileges 
where information should be released.”). 
 192. See Jenny Hendrix, NSA Surveillance Puts George Orwell’s ‘1984’ on 
Bestseller Lists, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2013/jun/11/entertainment/la-et-jc-nsa-surveillance-puts-george-orwells-1984-
on-bestseller-lists-20130611 (last visited June 6, 2015) (quoting President 
Obama’s defense of the N.S.A. surveillance program: “In the abstract, you can 
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embraced a movement away from monarchy towards democracy, 
they exhibited distrust towards government and feared potential 
abuses of governmental power. This distrust is evident in the fact 
that the Framers embraced Montesquieu’s notion of separation of 
powers and created a system that involved checks and 
balances.193 In addition, the founding generation was worried 
that the doctrine of separation of powers did not provide sufficient 
protection against governmental abuse and demanded what 
became the Bill of Rights.194  
While it is difficult to know for sure how other generations 
would have reacted, one can relatively easily surmise that the 
founding generation would have been dumbfounded to learn of 
the NSA’s surveillance and data collection program. 
Unquestionably, the technology that the NSA has employed to 
implement its program is beyond anything that they could 
possibly have been imagined at that time. Beyond that, the 
founding generation was concerned about governmental abuses 
of power, and such a broad-based surveillance program presents 
a huge potential for abuse. Despite governmental claims that 
such spying is needed to protect Americans against terrorists, the 
founding generation might have feared that governmental 
officials would use its data collection against Americans.  
Of course, the fundamental problem with the NSA 
surveillance relates to the secrecy with which it was conducted. 
In a democratic society, in which the power to govern flows from 
the consent of the governed, one can legitimately question 
whether the government should be operating such a massive 
surveillance program shrouded in secrecy. It is important that 
the people be allowed to debate the competing values and to weigh 
in on the size and scope of the program. Perhaps the American 
public will decide that the global war against terrorism justifies 
the potential risks presented by such a program. Perhaps not. 
                                                                                                     
complain about Big Brother and how this is a potential program run amok, but 
when you actually look at the details, then I think we've struck the right 
balance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 193. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (focusing on Montesquieu’s 
separation of powers doctrine to reduce tyranny in the Federal Government). 
 194. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing the states’ 
condition of adoption of a bill of rights to ratify the Constitution). 
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Regardless, society should be given a full and fair opportunity to 
have this debate. 
